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One Year Anniversary of the Tragic Murders of Two Oklahomans, Gary and Linda Haas, by escaped prison inmates from ASP-Kingman in Arizona


Hole_in_Fence_at_Kingman.jpgOne year ago today, three convicted murderers escaped from the Arizona State Prison in Kingman, Arizona, known as ASP-Kingman.  ASP-Kingman, at the time and currently, is owned and operated by Management and Training Corporation (MTC), a private, for-profit company that operates prisons throughout the country, through a lucrative contract with the State of Arizona through the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC).  The escapes occurred at sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. on the night of July 30, 2010.  What led to and allowed for the escapes may be the most glaring and unfathomable example of gross negligence and institutional corporate malfeasance in our country's history. 

MTC failed to protect the public from the escape of dangerous murderers from itsMTC_logo.png prison.  Every element imaginable to help facilitate a prison escape existed at ASP-Kingman on July 30, 2010, and had existed for an extended period of time.  MTC failed to recognize and apparently chose to ignore numerous glaring security deficiencies at the prison, which made it highly susceptible to inmates escaping. 

The laundry list of failures and gross omissions on the part of MTC is almost too implausible to believe.  A perimeter alarm system that was completely inoperable and faulty.  In fact, the perimeter alarm system at ASP-Kingman sounded false alarms hundreds and hundreds of times a day.  As such, security staff routinely ignored these constant false alarms.  What's more, MTC administrative and leadership staff at ASP-Kingman also ignored the on-going problems with the defective perimeter alarm system at the prison and did nothing to correct it for over two years.  In fact, MTC cancelled the contract with the third-party vendor it was supposed to maintain the alarm (per its contract with the State of Arizona to own and operate the prison) in order to save money by making alarm maintenance an in-house staff duty, one that was never done. 

Numerous other flagrant deficiencies were identified by the State of Arizona in a series of investigations that occurred after the escape.  Arizona Department of Corrections Director Charles Ryan discussed some of the most appalling and mind-boggling omissons

  • A Faulty Perimeter Alarm System. MTC's perimeter alarm system had been malfunctioning for two years and was totally inoperable at the time of the escape.
  • MTC cancelled the Alarm Maintenance Contract. Two years before the escape, MTC cancelled the mandatory maintenance contract with the company that installed the perimeter alarm system in order to cut corners and save money.
  • Hundreds of Daily False Alarms Ignored and Left Unchecked. The prison experienced hundreds of false alarms daily from its faulty perimeter alarm system. MTC security staff regularly ignored the alarms and routinely failed to check and clear perimeter zone alarms.
  • Perimeter Alarm Sensors and Perimeter Flood Lights Non-Operational. None of the eight sensors in the perimeter alarm system functioned properly at the time of the escape. In addition, at least eight flood lights on the perimeter of the prison were burnt out on the night of the escape.
  • Prison Perimeter Unguarded at the Time of the Escape. MTC had absolutely no personnel patrolling the prison perimeter at the time of the escape.
  • Significant Delay in Notifying Authorities of Escape. Over an hour passed before MTC realized the inmate escape had occurred and another hour passed before MTC finally notified Mohave County and State Authorities of the escape.
  • Untrained and Incompetent MTC Personnel. MTC staff failed to perform their job duties by ignoring and failing to correct obvious systematic security deficiencies. Several MTC employees were terminated after the escape, including the Warden, the Chief of Security and Unit Managers.
  • Untrained and Incompetent State Monitors. State/ADC Officials responsible for monitoring the prison were also fired in the aftermath of the escape. David Lee, the lead monitor, admitted to being untrained and unqualified for his position and stated that he had never even read the contract between the State and MTC. When questioned by the State after the escape, Lee told investigators: "...I know I screwed up, my priorities were not where they should be."
  • Failure to Notify Public of Change in Prison Population. The State and MTC failed to notify the general public and State and Local officials when they agreed to change ASP-Kingman to a medium security prison, housing violent offenders. The prison clearly did not meet medium security safety standards.
  • Continuing Deficiencies and a History of Contract Non-Compliance. New information obtained since the escape shows problems still remain at the prison and that MTC has a history of contract non-compliance and security problems at other prisons its operates throughout North America, including numerous prior prison escapes, inmate riots and murders.

But what, if anything, did MTC learn from this escape?  Apparently nothing.  After the escapes and a series of reviews by the State, it took eight months and a formal threat by Director Ryan that he would terminate MTC's contract if it didn't fix the continued problems within 90 days, before the company finally shored up security at ASP-Kingman to the ADC's satisfaction.

Director Ryan outlined his continued criticisms and what he termed "chronic operational deficiencies which have been unaddressed or inadequately addressed over the past 5 months" in a letter dated December 29, 2010. 
T
he letter states that it is "intended to document the status of the contract in light of...those (corrective actions) still required subsequent to the tragic and avoidable escapes from the Hualapai Unit, ASP-Kingman on July 30, 2010" and "the necessary curative actions required from MTC at Kingman in order to determine that your operations are compliant with ADC policy...and for me to determine that I have enough confidence in your responsiveness and operations to continue the contract."  Remember, this is 6 months AFTER the escape.

Charles_Ryan_ADC.jpgRyan's letter goes on to state that he was "looking for sustained and systematic improvements in your (MTC's) operation that will support independent compliance with ADC policy and contract requirements."  While Ryan also admits that "the ADC monitor and his administrator (at the time of the escape) were not performing their duties adequately," he states that he had "personally toured your facilities on a number of occasions...and have observed evidence of...non-compliance discovered by various teams."  

Ryan further states that MTC while had "instituted a number of the physical plant improvements...not the least of which was the perimeter alarm system which has been dysfunctional or unreliable for the better part of 2 1/2 years,...MTC Kingman has not effected sustained systematic operational improvements" as of Decembe 29, 2010.  So, on other words, 6 months after the escapes, MTC was operating with business as usual at Kingman.  

Bob Ortega, an investigative reporter for The Arizona Republic recently published a detailed article on the aftermath of the Kingman escapes titled :  "Arizona Prisons Slow to Fix Flaws in Wake of Kingman Escape."  In this article, Ortega points out the fact that it tool eight months and a formal threat from Director Ryan that he would terminate MTC's contract for MTC to finally fix the on-going problems at the prison.  In fact, follow up investigations in November 2010 (over 3 months after the escape) showed MTC had failed in its "public promise" to correct the security flaws.  While MTC had installed an entire new perimeter alarm system (since the old one was totally useless), "they weren't working properly and went off so often that staff still ignored them, auditors said."  Whats more, "problems with security lights and the control panels continued; inmates still weren't wearing ID's; tracks in the sand along the perimeter fence left by auditors were not noticed by MTC staff; Doors were left unsecured and unmonitored and inmate searches still weren't being conducted properly.   

Ortega also went on to point out that, "at Kingman, MTC receives $62.16 per inmate per day from the State - about $79 million a year at full capacity, or $64 million a year at its current population (80% capacity)."  

In other words, it has been business as usual for MTC since the escapes. A prison that was completely lacking in all areas of security at the time of the July 2010 escapes, was still devoid of adequate security 6 months after and MTC has still failed to correct the on-going problems.  Thus, the public remained at constant risk. 

Gary_and_Linda_Beautiful.JPGToday, on the 1 year anniversary of the deaths of Gary and Linda Haas, we honor and remember them and send our deepest condolences and love to the family.  At Nix Law Group, PLLC, we continue to seek justice for this family and accountability from MTC, the State of Arizona and the other corporate actor who are responsible for their 100% preventable deaths.  

For more information on the case, please see the Press Release - August 2, 2011 sent out today.  In addition, please visit and "Like" our firm's Facebook page -  Nix Law Group, PLLC and follow us on Twitter @NixLawGroup for continued updates and information about the cases as they progress through litigation.  

You can also visit our blog:  Oklahoma Injury Law Advocate for additional information about the on-going cases.